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By Major Anthony Pollman, USMC (Ret.)
Marine Corps culture is rooted in the service’s long and storied history. Arguably, its culture is what 
differentiates it from other services and contributes to its fighting prowess and success.  
A recent Proceedings article highlighted the need to “foster an inclusive culture” to reach the Commandant’s goal 
of a 10-percent female Marine Corps. 1 The article also makes the case for strength through diversity. Yet, the 
Commandant recently had to deal with a revenge porn scandal that alienated female Marines and is symptomatic 
of a culture that runs counter to the goal of a diverse Corps. 2 The Marines have been battling with issues such as 
this for years. 3 It seems the very culture that makes the Marine Corps adaptable and successful on the battlefield 
makes it difficult to integrate women into combat units.  
As in any organization, Marine Corps culture must evolve to fit the ever-changing environment in which it 
operates. Engineers know: what can be measured can be changed. Or, to put it another way, do you really 
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understand something you cannot measure? To this point, organizational culture theory offers tools that can 
measure culture, enable a deeper cultural understanding, frame the narrative, and aid in change.  
DIAGNOSING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE  
Organizational culture includes shared language, notable historical achievements or milestones, and identifying 
features such as uniforms. It also includes underlying values and assumptions and how those show up in 
everyday situations. It is the glue that binds an organization together. Moreover, organizational culture is linked to 
performance. While culture often is perceived as static, it changes over time in response to internal and external 
pressures. 4 
Organizational culture is not command climate. Command climate varies from command to command, and there 
is a correlation between command climate survey results and local leadership. Organizational culture is an 
enterprise-level attribute that is linked to identity and default assumptions. Organizational culture is the common 
thread that touches everything an organization does.  
The Competing Values Framework is a theoretical construct that structures organizational culture in terms of two 
key sets of parameters: flexibility and discretion versus stability and control in one dimension, and internal focus 
and integration versus external focus and differentiation in the other. 5 The framework produces four 
characteristic culture types: clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy. Organizations tend to have a dominant type, 
but most organizations also have some elements of each type present. Figure 1 summarizes the framework and 
provides examples of each of these characteristic cultures. The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument 
(OCAI) measures culture in terms of the Competing Values Framework.  
Frameworks are valuable because they allow leadership to look at common themes and trends and make 
connections. Organizational culture profiles can serve as road maps for cultural management or change and tools 
for assessing the progress of cultural change initiatives.  
MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
In 2014, the OCAI was administered to a representative 
population of successful mid-career Marine officers. 6 
Figure 2 is a profile showing the results. For 
comparison, the figure shows a conjectured Army 
organizational culture profile from a 2008 Army War 
College study by Stephen Gerras, Leonard Wong, and 
Charles Allen. 7 It also presents the results of an OCAI 
from 2010 for a representative sample of successful 
mid-career Army officers. 8 The results suggest the Army 
and Marine Corps both have market-dominated 
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hierarchy cultures; that is, they are organizations with an 
external focus that value stability and control.  
Marines believe they are culturally different from the 
Army. Indoctrination from boot camp onward reinforces 
this—it is an indisputable part of the Marine Corps 
narrative. Yet, these results suggest the two services 
are more alike than different. Gerras, Wong, and Allen 
from the Army War College supposed the Army was a 
rigid hierarchy. 9 But their conjecture was not supported 
by Pierce’s findings. 10 Both these examples highlight 
the pitfalls of relying on narrative alone.  
Measuring something makes it real, makes it tangible, and makes it objectively describable. Augmenting narrative 
with measured values and in terms of an agreed on framework helps eliminate bias and misconceptions. Then, 
much like with a terrain map, if you can orient yourself, you can figure out how to get where you need to go. 
Armed with an accurate picture of where you are, you can figure out where you want to be culturally and have 
some hope of seeing the desired change come to fruition. In addition, you have a way of verifying that something 
changed. 
So, in terms of the Competing Values Framework, what does Marine Corps culture look like? Contrary to what 
casual observers might think, the Corps is not a rigid hierarchy. Rather, it is a market-dominated hierarchy with a 
family feel. “Market-dominated” does not mean it is competing to sell products. Rather, a market culture is one 
that combines an external focus with stability and control. To put it another way, the Marine Corps is an 
organization that predominately is focused outward (on the enemy), values stability and control (pursues 
consistent results), and yet seeks internal integration (teamwork).    
USING THE FRAMEWORK  
The Competing Values Framework can be used as a decision aid to maintain the culture while addressing 
emerging issues, or it can be used to change the culture to achieve a desired new culture. In either case, being 
able to verify the outcome through measurement would be useful. Two cases illustrate these orientations. 
As the Commandant and other leaders react to incidents like the Marines United scandal, they must make 
decisions about what to do. The default generally seems to be policy enactment and enforcement. In terms of the 
Competing Values Framework, this is a hierarchal or control approach. At the same time, the Marine Corps 
prides itself on pushing decisions and authority to the lowest level. In terms of the Competing Values Framework, 
this is would fall in one of the two flexibility/discretion cultures. Enacting and enforcing more policies runs counter 
to the flexibility and discretion maneuver warfare requires, and it can make junior leaders feel marginalized or not 
trusted. Thus, the default response creates an internal culture clash.  
While the framework does not give direction on what to do, it does provide an appreciation for this cultural 
dichotomy. Armed with this understanding, leaders can make decisions about actions beyond policies that may 
be necessary to maintain the right cultural balance. The fact is, leaders can policy the Corps to death, and some 
Marines will find a way around it. There comes a point where you have to develop subordinates and trust them to 
do the right thing within specified boundaries.  
Using the framework, an alternative or supplemental approach to developing policies could be to reemphasize 
the familial (clan) nature of the Marine Corps. Marines are all brothers and sisters in arms; they take care of each 
other. Would a good brother post a compromising picture of his sister online? At some level, the Marines United 
scandal, female integration, minority integration, hazing, and many other challenges are issues of inappropriate 
relationships or behaviors within in the clan. If Marines really thought of themselves as family or a team or 
inclusive, or there was no such thing as a black Marine or a woman Marine, just Marines, these problems would 
solve themselves.  
However, this begs the question: Does the culture need to be changed or do Marines just need to live up to their 
own ethos, expectations, and narrative?      
Sometimes the culture does need to change to achieve desired outcomes. Innovation is a clear case. Marine 
leadership wants Marines to be more innovative. 11 In terms of the framework, adhocracies are good at innovation 
or creating new things. Adhocracies are organizations that are externally focused and value flexibility and 
discretion. An example would be a Silicon Valley start-up. Adhocracy is the least stressed culture in the Marine 
Corps profile. As such, Marine Corps culture ensures that the organization is nearly incapable of true innovation. 
It values stability and control too much.  
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Hyman Rickover said, “More than ambition, more than ability, it is rules that limit contribution; rules are the lowest 
common denominator of human behavior; they are a substitute for rational thought.” 12 If the Marine Corps truly 
wants to become an innovative organization, it has to learn to accept failure and trade rulemaking (stability and 
control) for greater flexibility and discretion. But since much of what the Corps does is enshrined in law or 
inviolate policy, the structural and cultural change required for the enterprise to become innovative likely is not 
possible. Rather, junior Marines or organizations such as the Ellis Group will continue to improvise so long as 
leadership is not looking too closely.   
Active DUty Versus Reserve Culture 
Marine Corps Reserve culture is thought to differ from active-duty culture, creating noticeable operational friction. 
A preliminary assessment using the Competing Values Framework supports this conjecture. In terms of the 
framework, the Reserve was found to have a stronger clan culture at the expense of the market culture. This 
would suggest the importance of being collaborative rather than competitive when working within the Reserve.  
ENABLING CULTURE CHANGE 
Rather than continuing to react to scandal with policy edicts, it may be time for the Marine Corps to consider 
cultural management. Tools such as the Competing Values Framework offer the insights necessary to address 
present issues and to innovate to address anticipated future challenges, both internally and externally and 
operationally and administratively. They also can provide leadership insight into how Marines view the enterprise 
and their place in it, as well as measure the success of change initiatives. Thus armed, leadership can make 
informed decisions that allow the organization to remain true to its roots while adapting in response to the 
environment.  
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